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Thank you Madam Chair for the kind introduction and thank you
also to Mike Moore and the WTO Secretariat for the opportunity to
speak at the beginning of this two-day symposium on issues
confronting the world trading system.
I
am not an economist or a trade expert. But I have worked on
development issues for over two decades. I am privileged to serve as
president of World Vision International, a relief and development
organisation now working in nearly 100 countries.
Among
our development work, for example, are irrigation and food security
projects in Ethiopia, health centres in India, street children’s
programs in Cambodia, and horticultural export projects in Brazil.
We recognise, however, that alleviating poverty and suffering must
occur at two levels: at the grassroots with the poor, and through
international institutions, like the WTO, where the policymakers
make the decisions that affect the poor. Therefore, our organisation
also advocates on issues such as child rights, peace and conflict
resolution, and trade and development.
I
do not claim to speak on behalf of the world’s poor. I am not in
their shoes. But I have spent a good deal of time with the poor. I
have listened to their stories. I have seen their suffering and
struggle. I have seen them work long and hard and still remain poor.
Over
the past three decades, I have met with poor people in more than 100
developing countries. I have sat with mothers whose children were
dying of hunger-related diseases because their governments lacked
the capacity to deliver food and health care. I have met with small
farmers whose livelihoods were destroyed first by drought and then
by supposed relief grain unwisely dumped on the local market. I have
talked with sidewalk vendors who saw most of their meagre daily
earnings go on exorbitant loans which were their only source of
credit. And I have seen the victims of hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, and war – virtually all of them poor -- needlessly suffer
for lack of infrastructure and resources.
I
see these tragedies played out again and again in developing
countries. They raise many questions about the way the world works
and why the poor suffer first and suffer most.
So,
at the beginning of a two-day symposium on issues confronting the
world trading system, I would like to raise some questions, rather
than try to provide answers. I do not intend to address most of the
main workshop themes directly.
Instead,
I want to use this time to explore some of the fundamental questions
that underlie our discussions. I want to address what I view as the
most important challenge confronting the world trading system - the
crisis of development, which, I believe, imperils the legitimacy of
the world trading system.
Trade
is a means to development; children need special protection back
to top
Let
me be clear. I hold two fundamental beliefs about trade.
First,
the purpose of trade should be to promote human development and
reduce poverty.
Trade
is not an end it itself. It is a means to an end. I believe that end
must be sustainable human development that reduces poverty. Trade is
good and useful when it serves that end. When it does not, it can be
an obstacle to development. Our trade policies and institutions
should be evaluated, not in terms of whether they promote more
commerce, simply for the sake of more commerce. They should be
evaluated on how they serve the goal of promoting development and
reducing poverty. Trade, I believe, is a subset of the bigger and
more fundamental matter of human development.
Secondly,
children need special consideration and protection when developing
trade policy.
Please
bear in mind the vulnerability of children in developing countries.
Ill-considered liberalisation and poorly planned trade and economic
policy put children at profound risk. They basically have one
opportunity to get the essential nourishment they need as infants to
promote strong physical and mental growth. They get one opportunity
for the chance of an education and literacy and the hope of a better
future.
There
have been ill-advised macroeconomic policies that had the unintended
effect of closing schools, shutting health clinics, and ending jobs.
If there is no money to pay the teacher, does that girl or boy have
an opportunity to become literate? If those children fail to become
literate, will they learn good nutrition and health care? Will they
have job opportunities? Will they be cheated by unscrupulous
moneylenders and corrupt bureaucrats? In short, will they avoid the
cycle of poverty if bad trade policy creates a situation in which
essential human services are under-financed or unavailable?
Whatever
trade policies we choose, we must ensure that they promote, rather
than hinder, the education, health and welfare of children. If we
neglect children, we neglect the future of the world.
So,
these are my two fundamental premises: 1) the purpose of trade is to
promote human development and reduce poverty; and 2) children need
special consideration and protection when determining trade policy.
A
couple of observations back
to top
As
I said earlier, I intend to pose some questions that I hope can be
considered in the discussions over the next two days. Before doing
so, however, I would like to make a couple of observations. Neither
of these observations is new and both have made elsewhere. But I
would like us to keep them in mind as we deliberate over trade
matters.
1)
Costs of participating in a world trade system
Firstly,
please bear in mind how difficult it is for poor nations to
participate in trade negotiations. We live in a very lopsided world,
in which the poor struggle to even approach the table, much less
bear the costs of participation.
Overseas
development aid has fallen far short of the promises made by
developed countries.
In
1996, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee adopted a number
of development goals, which, among other things, included targets
such as(1):
-
Reduction
of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in
developing countries by at least one-half by 2015.
-
Universal
primary education in all countries by 2015.
-
Elimination
of gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.
-
A
67 percent reduction from the 1990 level of the death rate for
infants and children under five in all developing countries by
2015.
-
A
75 percent reduction from the 1990 level of the rate of maternal
mortality in all developing countries by 2015.
At
the Geneva 2000 Social Summit last year, the UN, World Bank, IMF and
OECD released a report on the international development goals called
A Better World for All. The report showed very clearly that “a
better world” is, in fact, receding for many of the world’s
inhabitants.
When
the development goals were formulated in 1996, average OECD aid was
0.34 percent of Gross National Product. Since then, with some
notable exceptions, most OECD countries have been cutting their aid
budgets. As of last year, the average assistance had dropped to 0.22
percent! Tragically, between 1990-2000 real per capita assistance to
the least developed countries – those which need it most - dropped
by 45 percent!
If
the developed countries had maintained their 1992 levels of
assistance, developing countries would have received an additional
US $136 billion in aid.(2) But they didn’t. Ironically, developed
countries will go to the UN’s Financing for Development conference
next year proclaiming that they are committed to the 1996 goals. Yet
they have never given less aid as a proportion of their GNPs. Given
this situation, developing countries may be sceptical about the OECD
countries proclaiming their commitment to a “development
round.”
This
growing distance between the wealth of the North and the poverty of
the South undermines world trade negotiations. There is no level
playing field. Some countries have no representatives in Geneva.
Others rely on a solitary individual who works out of tiny, cramped
office and is saddled with numerous other chores. Meanwhile, some
delegations have teams of diplomats and lawyers schooled in the
subtlest nuances of trade policies and practices.
Declining
overseas assistance aggravates this situation. Most developed
countries have been cutting aid for a decade. These same developed
countries are now requesting a new round of trade negotiations, a
new round requiring more meetings, more complex discussions, more
agreements, more new laws, and more concessions from developing
countries.
How
can we imagine that such a system will produce equitable trade
outcomes? Many developing countries have neither the resources to
negotiate trade agreements nor the capacity to implement them.
It
can cost developing countries a great deal of money to implement and
adjust to WTO agreements. At a minimum, these costs include
purchasing equipment, training people, establishing systems of
checks and balances, creating and strengthening institutions, and
enhancing administrative and monitoring capacities. For example, a
recent World Bank study noted that to gain acceptance for its meat,
vegetables and fruit in industrial country markets, Argentina spent
over $80 million to achieve higher levels of plant and animal
sanitation. Hungary spent over $40 million to improve the level of
sanitation of its slaughterhouses alone. Mexico spent more than $30
million to upgrade intellectual property laws and enforcement.
Customs reform projects can easily cost $20 million. Such costs, for
complying with just three of the six main Uruguay Round Agreements
that involve restructuring of domestic regulations, exceed the
annual development budget for seven of the 12 least developed
countries for which the authors could find a figure(3).
Given
the scarcity of funds for development -- not least because of
plummeting aid levels -- is this really the best use of a poor
nation’s resources? In some cases the answer may be “yes,” but in many cases, it clearly is not. Developing
countries usually can’t choose which reforms they will make,
depending on their circumstances. They have to implement the whole
lot, regardless of their human and financial resources.
I
find it puzzling that, for an agenda supposedly driven by economic
theory, trade reforms are almost never subjected to a proper, full,
cost-benefit analysis. I don’t just mean an economic forecast, or
even a general equilibrium model of the pros and cons of trade
reform. I mean a proper cost-benefit analysis with an attempt to
calculate real opportunity costs, correct shadow prices, equitable
distributional weights, externality estimates, such as the real
costs of environmental degradation, and so on.
We
must give more serious attention to the very high costs for poor
nations to participate in the world trade system.
2)
Assumption that open trade necessarily promotes development
My
second observation is that we should examine very carefully the
assumption that trade liberalisation necessarily promotes
development.
As
I said earlier, I’m neither an economist nor a trade expert. But a
number of people who are experts doubt the conventional wisdom that
trade liberalisation necessarily fosters economic growth. They also
question whether the developed countries of the West and East Asia
really owe their development to “open” markets.
A
recent study done for the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research
calls into question several previous cross-country studies that
purported to demonstrate a strong link between open trade and
economic growth.(11) Dani Rodrik of Harvard and co-author Francisco
Rodríguez contend that major methodological problems mean that most
of the studies purporting to demonstrate such a link are flawed.
After a detailed analysis of several key papers, they conclude that
there is little evidence that open trade policies -- in the form of
lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trading – are
significantly associated with economic growth. They close with this
warning:
“We
do not want to leave the reader with the impression that we
think trade protection is good for economic growth. We know of
no credible evidence – at least for the post-1945 period –
that suggests that trade restrictions are systematically
associated with higher growth rates. What we would like the
reader to take away from this paper is some caution and humility
in interpreting the existing cross-national evidence on the
relationship between trade policy and economic growth.
“The
tendency to greatly overstate the systematic evidence in favour
of trade openness has had a substantial influence on policy
around the world. Our concern is that the priority afforded to
trade policy has generated expectations that are unlikely to be
met, and it may have crowded out other institutional reforms
with potentially greater payoffs.”
This
study and others suggest that other factors may be far more
important for development than trade liberalisation. For instance: A
sound development and investment strategy that fosters domestic
industry with adequate incentives for learning and productivity
growth; long-term spending on health and education and job training;
establishing quality institutions such as a credit and banking
environment in which small businesses can flourish, and so on.
I’m
not necessarily an advocate of open markets or of high tariff walls.
But I am an advocate of examining the assumption that trade
liberalisation will necessarily lead to human development. It may;
it may not – depending on the circumstances of each particular
country.
I
think we should also examine the commonly held belief that the
industrialised countries of Europe, North America and East Asia
developed through free and open trade.
Paul
Bairoch, a respected economic historian who works here at the
University of Geneva, doesn’t find much to support that argument.
He notes that it wasn’t until 1842 that Britain really began to
lower her trade barriers – after nearly a century and a half of
protected industrialisation. She imposed “free trade” on
India and in the process all but destroyed India’s highly
developed textile and iron industries. Latin America’s textile
industries suffered a similar fate.(6)
The
United Kingdom, France, Germany and especially the United States,
all developed their domestic industries behind tariff walls and with
other instruments such as below market-rate loans. A recent
econometric study in one of the top economic journals showed very
clearly that tariffs were in fact positively correlated with
economic growth for these and six other developed countries between
1875 and 1914.(7)
More
recently, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea used various measures to
industrialise that were anything but “free trade.” Many of
these measures are now banned under WTO rules or soon could be.(8)
They include high levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, public
ownership of large segments of banking and industry, export
subsidies, local content requirements, import-export linkages,
patent and copyright infringements, restrictions on capital flows,
directed and subsidised credit and so on.(9)
Let
me be clear. I am not suggesting that a blanket policy of protecting
infant industries is the solution. Such industries, protected for
too long, can become bloated and inefficient. Encouraging exports is
definitely important. But there must be a more nuanced approach to
each country’s particular situation, its history and its stage of
development. Countries need to tailor trade policies to their
particular situations. Comparative economic advantage is dynamic and
can be acquired. It is not static. Learning, information and
productivity growth are particularly critical. Economic history
clearly demonstrates that government institutions and assistance in
various forms, including tariffs, can play an important role here.(10)
I
am not convinced that trade liberalisation necessarily promotes
development. I suggest we picture the United States, Britain,
Germany, Japan or South Korea when they were developing. Would they
have enjoyed such robust economic development if powerful,
industrialised nations had forced them to follow current – and
proposed – WTO rules?
Advocating
rapid trade liberalisation for all developing countries in all
economic sectors condemns poor nations to low levels of
industrialisation and dependence on a narrow range of export
commodities. Each developing country should be able to tailor its
trade policies for its particular situation and its development
strategy.
Five
questions back
to top
Okay,
you’ve heard my observations about the cost of participating in
the world trade system and the assumption that open trade promotes
development. Now I will pose five questions that I urge us to
consider during the discussions of the next two days.
Question
1: What does it mean to claim that trade reform results in a “net benefit”?
Advocates
of trade liberalisation often claim that trade reform results in a “net benefit.” Generally speaking, a
“net
benefit” is said to result when the overall benefits, usually
measured in monetary terms, are greater than the costs. But greater
for whom? Are the winners rich or poor? Where do they live? In
wealthy enclaves or in poor rural areas? Which regions benefit? What
are the gender effects? Does the “net benefit” result in
greater or lesser inequality? Does the “net benefit” make
it harder for poor women to feed their families but easier for the
middle class to buy low cost TVs? These are the kinds of vital
questions that lurk behind the glib assurances about the “net
benefits” of trade reform.
Three
years ago, I was in Indonesia just after the Suharto government fell
and the economy collapsed. We can blame the economic disaster on
political turmoil, corruption, bad loans, capital flight, an
artificially inflated currency, whatever. I think it is fair to say,
however, that Indonesia had been forced to embrace aspects of a
free-market structural adjustment programme that lacked many of the
safeguards that could have protected its economy and its people.
Near
the port of Jakarta, I met with families whose weekly incomes had
fallen from $10 to $1 because of devaluation. Meanwhile, the cost of
rice, the staple of their diet, had multiplied several times. The
children, especially the younger ones, were at risk for cholera and
diseases related to malnutrition. Because their parents could not
longer afford tuition, many children had dropped out of school. Some
were earning the equivalent of 30 cents a day shelling mussels. I
remember meeting a spirited 10-year-old girl named Mariana. She had
remained in school. Her father was earning a dollar a day collecting
sea sand in a small wooden boat, then bagging it and selling it. He
was one of the fortunate ones.
World
Vision began a food-for-work project in Mariana’s slum
neighbourhood. In exchange for rice, the unemployed cleaned sewers,
rebuilt walkways, and organised to meet community needs. In time,
some found paying jobs and some children returned to school. But,
three years later, most of Mariana’s neighbours have not recovered
what little they once had.
So
what was the “net benefit” of economic reform and
structural adjustment for Indonesia? Walk around Mariana’s
neighbourhood near the port in Jakarta and the poor will tell you: “There was no benefit. We lost.”
Even
in cases where economic reform and trade liberalisation does bring
net benefits to a country or region, there are certain to be costs
as well as benefits - losers as well as winners. We know that. The
WTO acknowledges that. Our challenge is to do a better job of
identifying who the losers are likely to be, where they are, and how
they can best be helped, compensated, or, better yet, spared from
suffering in the first place.
The
WTO and its powerful member governments should pursue a balanced
approach that considers both the winners and losers of trade reform.
The question ought to be: How can trade best promote development and
poverty reduction? Trade policies should not enrich a few at the
expense of the many. They should ensure that the benefits of trade
are shared equitably.
Question
2: If trade reform is good, is rapid reform always better?
Trade
policy recommendations are often made on the basis of static
analysis – “snapshots” of the economy before and after a
policy change. If the second picture is better than the first –
that is, if it shows “net benefits” from the change –
the conclusion is that the policy change should be implemented.
But
what are the dynamics of the adjustment process of getting from the
first picture to the second? How are people’s lives impacted? Are
there alternative jobs available for workers displaced by plant
closures? Are there safety nets in place when they become
unemployed? Can a 45-year-old worker quickly retrain for another job
or will he and his family end up destitute? Often models predicting
gains from trade assume that displaced workers and resources will be
re-deployed elsewhere in the economy. But what if such redeployment
is not possible?
In
Ecuador, World Vision documented the effects on workers of
trade-induced changes in the marketplace. They found serious
psychological, and indeed spiritual traumas, with long-term
consequences, with idled workers made to feel unwanted, worthless
and hopeless. Social standing, respect, and honour were highly
dependent on their jobs.(4) Trade-induced structural adjustments
affect more than “factors of production.” They affect
people. An important consideration must be the capacity of people
and society to absorb the effects of trade reform, especially rapid
reform.
With
rapid trade reform, the poor are likely to be the first to suffer
and the last to benefit. Especially when there is no social safety
net. Many developing countries cannot afford unemployment or health
insurance. Trade agreements must recognise the social impact of the
policies they put in place.
Aside
from the speed at which trade reform is pushed, it is also important
to evaluate the quality of any economic growth resulting from trade
reform. The quality of growth matters. A single-minded focus on
exports for exports’ sake can have devastating social and
environmental consequences. In Latin America, Africa, and other
parts of the developing world, some commodities with high
environmental costs have been overproduced to compensate for the
reduced price they get in the global market. If trade reform
aggravates these conditions, it is not quality trade reform.
Question
3: Why do developed countries advocate the benefits of “open” trade yet keep their markets relatively closed to
many goods from developing countries?
Many
from developing countries will share my frustration at the lack of
real progress in opening the markets of developed countries to your
goods. Wealthy nations often shut out your most important products,
especially agricultural commodities, processed foods, textiles,
clothing and footwear.
Access
to developed country markets can make a tremendous difference to
poor communities. I’ll give you an example from our experience
with poor farmers in Brazil. In this case, there was a way around
trade barriers. We began this project two years ago with 500 farm
families in the impoverished northeast states of Alagoas and Rio
Grande do Norte. We called it a “fair trade” program. The
goal was to connect these farmers with international partners so
that their produce could be sold directly at prices fair to both the
farmer and the retailer. The farmers, who receive training in
marketing, finance and appropriate technology, retain control from
production to final sale.(5)
So
far, the results are very encouraging. The farmers have sold cashew
nuts, green peppers, watermelons and pineapples to large
international supermarket chains in Europe. They have seen their
average monthly income increase from $75 to $210. They have been
able to pay their debts, maintain their equipment, and increase
production. Their produce has gained visibility in both local and
international markets where it is known for its quality and for the
use of the “fair trade” label.
Unfortunately,
this good news from Brazil is the exception. In dozens of other
countries where we work with small producers, they find it extremely
difficult to export their goods to developed countries. The barriers
against their goods cost poor countries billions of dollars every
year in lost trade – far, far more than these countries receive in
development assistance. We need policies that will increase market
access for goods from developing countries while reducing the abuses
of antidumping and special safeguard measures.
Question
4: What institutional requirements need to be in place to make sure
that trade promotes development?
Trade
will not promote sound development if civil institutions are
corrupt, in disarray or non-existent. Such institutions include
adequate recognition and protection of property rights, the rule of
law, contract enforcement, an independent judiciary, a skilled and
honest bureaucracy, safety nets for those adversely affected by
sudden economic change, institutions to manage conflict and so on.
How
are these institutions to be developed in countries where they are
weak or non-existent? How long does it take? How long will it take
to rebuild the capacities of the state and social capital in
countries devastated by ill-considered structural adjustment
programs? What human and financial resources are required? How
should the WTO treat such countries? Can developing countries be
lumped together and arbitrarily assigned a mere extra five or 10
years to implement WTO agreements?
Three
weeks ago, I visited our area development programs in Mongolia. It
was not my first visit. I was also there in the winter of 1998.
Other than the change of seasons and a change of government, I must
say that not much appeared to have changed. To be sure, World Vision
was doing more work with abandoned children, juvenile offenders and
unemployed workers. But our staff and the rest of the Mongolian
people, abruptly swept from communism into laissez-faire capitalism
a decade ago, continue to live in an environment in which many
institutions are either absent or ineffective. The banking system is
obsolete. Transport is antiquated or inadequate. Land titles are
unclear. Ill-advised legislation and corruption have made economic
reform extremely challenging. Local industries are so small and
under-capitalised that most products are imported.
Mongolia,
a WTO member, is not classified as a “least developed
country.” It is termed a “developing country.” As
such the WTO requires it to reduce any tariffs on agricultural
products (its principal exports) by 24 percent over 10 years.
Reasonable perhaps until one considers the great task Mongolia faces
in nation building. In the absence of well-developed institutions,
how does trade best promote development in countries like Mongolia?
In
short, a comprehensive development and trade strategy must factor in
the time, resources, and expertise required to build sound
institutions in developing countries.
Question
5: Is it not possible for the WTO to give more consideration to
market structure and market power?
Much
economic and trade modelling assumes perfect competition. But, as we
all know, the real world does not always work like that. Some
corporations are extremely large while most businesses and some
economies are small. For example, the combined sales revenues of
General Motors and Wal-Mart last year were larger than the Gross
Domestic Products of all of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries put
together.(12)
An
analysis of market structure and market power in key areas like
agriculture, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and financial services
is critical for determining appropriate trade policies. Yet market
structure and market power do not get anywhere near the attention
they deserve.
We
don’t have to search far for an example of how power structures
the market. As is evident from the news of the past few months, the
market power of the pharmaceutical corporations has greatly affected
the availability of AIDS drugs in developing countries. It’s
interesting to note, however, that popular opinion has been so
strong against these corporations that they have dramatically
slashed prices on retroviral drugs. The United States, recently
dropped its suit against Brazil for manufacturing inexpensive copies
of trademarked AIDS drugs.
The
size and vertical integration of agribusiness and biotechnology
firms is another example of concentrated market power. Such
concentration must be addressed in drafting trade policy around
agriculture, medical products and other goods. The Brazilian melon
farmer and the transnational agribusiness corporation are simply not
in the same arena. What is puzzling to me is that market power and
market structure are so rarely considered in trade negotiations.
Conclusion:
Is the time right for a new round of trade negotiations? back
to top
I’ve
given you my observations. I’ve raised five questions. I’ll
remind you of my fundamental belief that the purpose of trade is to
promote human development and reduce poverty with special
consideration for protecting children.
Now
you ask: Is the time right for a new round of trade negotiations?
I
think some things need to happen first. Namely:
-
There
should be a comprehensive review of the Uruguay Round’s
impacts on the poor before launching a new round.
-
The
concerns of developing countries over the implementation of the
Uruguay Round agreements should be addressed, and some of the
agreements, especially TRIPS, need to be reviewed. Developing
countries should not be expected to agree to a new round before
their concerns about the last one have been addressed.
-
The
agenda needs to be clarified before launching a new round.
Developing countries should not be expected to sign a blank
cheque by agreeing to a new round without being sure what’s in
it!
In
closing, I want to highlight again that our goal is human
development and the eradication of poverty – not increasing trade
for its own sake, without regard for who benefits and who suffers.
The
GATT, as we know, was born in the shadow of World War II. For its
first few rounds, it consisted primarily of negotiations between
countries at similar stages of economic, social and institutional
development. But today, the WTO consists of 142 nations, from the
richest and most powerful, to the very poorest. The system provides
some scope for differentiation, in terms of Special and Differential
treatment for developing countries, and some exemptions for Least
Developed Countries, but it falls painfully short of meeting the
vast range of needs among developing countries.
Development
policy requires a complex understanding of systems, combining
economic, social and cultural institutions and their changing
interactions over time. What is good for one phase of the
development process may be bad for the next phase. This is
particularly true with trade. For example, the loss of key
industries at an early stage of development can have a permanent
damaging effect.
Trade
policy prescriptions for a given country at a given time must be
anchored in a thorough understanding of that country’s situation
at that point in time. We must know how it got there. And we must
encourage an authentic, domestically conceived development
strategy.(13)
The
world trading system, as it currently exists, falls far short of
incorporating country specific development strategies that promote
genuine human development and protect children. But it could. My
hope is that our discussions these two days will help take us in
that direction.
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Notes:
1
: DAC, (1996) “Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of
Development Co-operation”, May, Development Assistance Committee of
the OECD, Paris, 20 pp, especially pp. 8-11 and 15-16. back
to text
2
: From: ‘The Reality of Aid 2000’. http://www.realityofaid.org
back
to text
3
: Finger, J.M. and Schuler, P., (1999) “Implementation of Uruguay
Round Commitments: The Development Challenge”, The WTO/World Bank
Conference on Developing Countries' Interests in a Millennium Round,
20-21 September 1999, Geneva, p. 25. back
to text
4
: This point came from World Vision Ecuador. back
to text
5
: From “Fair Trading Improves Lives of Poor Brazilian Families”,
By Betânia Barreto, World Vision News, 15 May 2001. back
to text
6
: Bairoch, P., (1993) Economics and World History: Myths and
Paradoxes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. back
to text
7
: O'Rourke, K.H., (2000) “Tariffs and Growth in the late 19th
Century”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 463, April, pp.
456-483. The other countries in the study were: Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden. back
to text
8
: Rodrik, D., (1995) “Getting interventions right: how South Korea
and Taiwan grew rich”, Economic Policy, Vol. 20, April, pp. 55-107;
Adelman, I., (2000) “Fifty Years of Economic Development: What Have
we Learned?”, Keynote address at the Annual Bank Conference on
Development Economics, June 26-28, Paris, 43 pp. back
to text
9
: Rodrik, D., (2001) “Trading in Illusions”, Foreign Policy,
March-April. back
to text
10
: See for example: Bruton, H.J., (1998) “A Reconsideration of Import
Substitution”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 2, June,
pp. 903-936. back
to text
11
: Rodríguez, F. and Rodrik, D., (2000) “Trade Policy and Economic
Growth: A Skeptics Guide to the Cross-National Evidence”, In
Macroeconomics Annual 2000 ed. Bernanke, B. and Rogoff, K.S.; MIT
Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. See
also: Rodrik, D., (2001) “The Global Governance of Trade as if
Development Really Mattered”, New York, Paper prepared for the UNDP,
June, 58 pp. Both papers can be found by clicking here
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12
: Source: World Bank and Fortune (2000) The Fortune Global 500, Vol.
142. No. 3, p. F1. back
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13
: Adelman, I., (2001) “Fallacies in Development Theory and Their
Implications for Policy”, In Frontiers of Development Economics: The
Future in Perspective ed. Meier, G.M. and Stiglitz, J.E.; The World
Bank & Oxford University Press, Washington DC & Oxford, pp.
103-134. back
to text |
