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> Guatemala — Cement I, para. 64
> Guatemala — Cement I, para. 65
> Guatemala — Cement I, paras. 67-68
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, footnote 82 to para. 83
> US — Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 — Japan), para. 172

S.5.1 Guatemala — Cement I, para. 64     back to top
(WT/DS60/AB/R)

… Article 17.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU as a special or additional rule and procedure. It is not listed precisely because it provides the legal basis for consultations to be requested by a complaining Member under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Indeed, it is the equivalent provision in the Anti-Dumping Agreement to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, which serve as the basis for consultations and dispute settlement under the GATT 1994, under most of the other agreements in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the “WTO Agreement”), and under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”).

 
S.5.2 Guatemala — Cement I, para. 65     back to top
(WT/DS60/AB/R)

… it is only where the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered agreement cannot be read as complementing each other that the special or additional provisions are to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them. An interpreter must, therefore, identify an inconsistency or a difference between a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of a covered agreement before concluding that the latter prevails and that the provision of the DSU does not apply.

 
S.5.3 Guatemala — Cement I, paras. 67-68     back to top
(WT/DS60/AB/R)

Clearly, the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of a covered agreement are not meant to replace, as a coherent system of dispute settlement for that agreement, the rules and procedures of the DSU. To read Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as replacing the DSU system as a whole is to deny the integrated nature of the WTO dispute settlement system established by Article 1.1 of the DSU. …

… we conclude that thePanelerredinfindingthatArticle17of the Anti-Dumping Agreement “provides for a coherent set of rules for dispute settlement specific to anti-dumping cases… that replaces the more general approach of the DSU”.

 
S.5.4 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, footnote 82 to para. 83     back to top
(WT/DS244/AB/R)

… We recall, that Article 1.1 of the DSU applies the rules and procedures contained in the DSU to “disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1”, but that this general rule is, under Article 1.2 of the DSU, subject to the special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement identified in Appendix 2 to the DSU. The Anti-Dumping Agreement is listed as a covered agreement in Appendix 1 of the DSU. Articles 17.4 through 17.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement are listed as special or additional rules in Appendix 2 to the DSU.

 
S.5.5 US — Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 — Japan), para. 172     back to top
(WT/DS322/AB/RW)

According to the United States, the relevant provisions for purposes of deciding the question before us are Article 13 and footnote 20 to Article 9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Japan, by contrast, refers to several provisions of the DSU that it considers indicate the actions that a respondent Member must take to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. We note, in this regard, that neither provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to which the United States refers is listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU as a special or additional rule and procedure that would prevail in case of conflict, in accordance with Article 1.2 of the DSU. Accordingly, the rule in Article 1.2 is inapplicable in this case. Therefore, both the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the DSU should be taken into account in this dispute and should be interpreted harmoniously. We begin our analysis with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that the United States considers relevant to the issue raised on appeal, after which we will turn to the provisions of the DSU.

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