The
GATS contains several negotiating mandates in rule-making areas which
Member felt unable within the timeframe of the Uruguay Round to consider
in detail. These negotiations are conducted in two Working Parties, one
on Domestic Regulation (Chapters III:2 and IV:2) and one on GATS Rules.
The latter Working Party is charged with negotiations on emergency safeguards
(Article X),
government procurement (Article XIII),
and subsidies (Article XV).
Emergency Safeguards
Emergency safeguards
in services may be expected to allow for the temporary suspension of market
access, national treatment and/or any additional commitments that Members
may have assumed in individual sectors. Any such mechanism, should it
be agreed to by Members, would need to be based on the principle of non-discrimination.
It would complement existing provisions under the GATS that already allow
for temporary or permanent departures from general obligations or specific
commitments. Relevant provisions include Article XII
if a Member experiences serious balance of payments and external financial
difficulties;
Article XIV if action is deemed necessary for overriding policy
concerns such as protection of life and health or protection of public
morals; and
Article XXI if a Member intends to withdraw or modify a commitment
on a permanent basis.
Contrasting with these provisions, a safeguards clause might be used to ease adjustment pressures in situations where a particular industry is threatened by a sudden increase in foreign supplies. If the Safeguards Agreement for goods is used as a precedent, the onus would be on a protection-seeking industry to demonstrate that a causal link exists between such increases in supplies and its suffering serious injury.
There are two main schools of thought among Members. One group is not convinced that such a mechanism is desirable, given the scheduling flexibility under the GATS and the risk of undermining the stability of existing commitments through new emergency provisions. There are also doubts whether a services safeguard would be workable in practice. Sceptical Members point to the scarcity of reliable trade and production data in many sectors, and the technical complexities associated with the multi-modal structure of the GATS. Another group of Members feels that the availability of safeguards in the event of unforeseeable market disruptions, would encourage more liberal commitments in services negotiations. In their view, abuse could be avoided through strict procedural disciplines. Data problems should not be exaggerated, given the existence in many sectors of professional associations, regulators and licensing bodies that compile relevant information.
