Disclaimer:
Opinions expressed in the case studies and any errors or omissions
therein are the responsibility of their authors and not of the
editors of this volume or of the institutions with which they are
affiliated. The authors of the case studies wish to disassociate the
institutions with which they are associated from opinions expressed
in the case studies and from any errors or omission therein.
> Case
Studies main page
> Introduction
ON THIS PAGE:
> I. The problem in context
> II. The local and external players and their roles
> The federal government
> The state governments
> Industry
> Academic institutions and think tanks
> Civil society
> III. Challenges faced and the
outcome
> Identification of key issues
> Consultations with industry
> Inter-ministerial consultations
> State-level consultations
> Finalization of the proposal by the Cabinet
> The perception of the WTO’s role in the process
> IV. Lessons for others (the players’ views)
|
I. The problem in context back to top
India submitted a very
detailed and comprehensive proposal(1) as part of the ongoing negotiations
on agriculture in the WTO in January 2001. It covered all aspects of the
negotiations and remains one of the longest proposals ever submitted by
any member. This study examines the manner in which this negotiating
proposal was finalized, the consultations that were undertaken and the
actual decision-making process that led to the submission of the
proposal. It attempts to identify the main protagonists and the key
stakeholders, the role that each one played in the process and the
extent to which, in their view, they succeeded in getting their concerns
reflected in the proposal. Finally, the study also tries to ascertain
from the stakeholders their perception of the WTO as an organization,
including in the context of the WTO’s perceived influence on the
process and final outcome.
Agriculture has been, and perhaps will remain
for some time, a key issue in the WTO, with the power to influence
negotiations, packages and the outcomes of Ministerial Conferences. It
is equally sensitive, if not even more so, in the Indian context. To
understand these sensitivities fully, including India’s emphasis on
self-sufficiency, it is important to keep in mind the extreme shortage
of food grain that the country faced in the 1950s and 1960s. It was only
the success of the ‘Green Revolution’ that helped India overcome its
dependence on food aid. The criticality and sensitivity of the Indian
agriculture sector can be further gauged by the following factors:
- the share of agriculture in the
national GDP is a huge 24%;
- a little over 700 million people,
that is about 69% of the population, are dependent on the rural
economy for their livelihood;
- a very large majority of this rural
population survives on an annual per capita income of US$175 as
compared with the current national per capita income of US$480;
- nearly 70% of cultivable land, that
is about 100 million hectares out of 142 million hectares, continues
to be vulnerable to the vagaries of the monsoon; and
- even though India is the
second-largest agricultural producer in the world, its yields are
still very low when compared with some of the other producers.
This would show why agriculture is such a
key issue for India in the WTO, and the constraints that were probably
factored in while finalizing the Indian proposal. Additionally, the
rural population in India, which is largely agro-based, has a
political mind of its own, and has the power (and often the
inclination) to prove the political ‘pundits’ wrong. This was
amply demonstrated in the recently held elections in which the ruling,
and favoured, National Democratic Alliance was voted out of power,
largely because the rural population felt neglected, and in fact
somewhat bypassed, by the much touted process of economic
liberalization. This power which the rural population wields makes the
decision-making process in agriculture even more sensitive and
consequently subject to even greater political scrutiny.
II. The local and
external players and their roles back to top
The federal government
The main protagonists in the
context of the agriculture negotiations at the federal level in India
are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The MOCI is mandated with the
primary responsibility for all WTO-related issues. The government of
India orders regarding the allocation of business state that it is the
MOCI which handles all issues related to ‘International trade and
commercial policy, including tariff and non-tariff barriers’.(2)
Within the MOCI, the Trade Policy Division (TPD) is responsible for the
work relating to the WTO. It is headed by a Special Secretary, who is
assisted by two senior joint secretaries and a team of nearly twenty
middle-management-level officers. The Permanent Secretary of the MOCI is
kept in the loop but for most issues the final decision and the
negotiating positions are largely formulated in the TPD itself.
On the other hand, the MOA is
the nodal ministry for all issues relating to agriculture, including the
work relating to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO). However, the situation is somewhat ambiguous when it
comes to agriculture issues within the WTO. International trade
negotiations no doubt come within the ambit of the MOCI, but the MOA
feels that when it comes to trade negotiations in agriculture then it
should be the lead protagonist. In fact, as a former official of the
Agriculture Ministry pointed out, ‘the first step taken by the
government, which set the ball rolling on the agriculture negotiations,
was taken by the MOA and not by the MOCI, in the form of a seminar
organized in conjunction with the FAO in June 1999’. This ambiguity is
compounded because the consultative process between the two ministries
is not institutionalized and, in the past, largely depended on personal
relationships between the officials heading these divisions.
Nonetheless, it is clear from the feedback provided by various officials
that on issues related to agriculture the MOCI has been careful to avoid
finalizing positions before obtaining the explicit approval of the MOA.
The role of the MEA as a
stakeholder, especially in the context of the agriculture negotiations,
is less clear. Its expertise in the negotiating process is not in doubt,
since it has negotiated most international agreements; what the MOCI
does doubt, however, is the MEA’s expertise in the substance of the
negotiation — and especially so in the case of agriculture. This perhaps
explains why the MEA does not appear to have been involved in the
consultative process to any significant extent.(3)
The state governments
back to top
The state governments were not
regarded as significant stakeholders during the Uruguay Round (UR) and
their involvement was minimal during the pre-UR consultations. This is
surprising, not only because are some of the Indian states larger than
many WTO members, but also because agriculture is a state subject.(4)
In fact, some state governments had, soon after the conclusion of the
UR, filed a case in India’s Supreme Court on the grounds that the
government of India had no authority to accept obligations arising out
of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) because of agriculture’s status
as a state subject. The government of West Bengal reiterated these
concerns in May 2001, saying that ‘agriculture is a state subject,
therefore all agreements, legislations etc., are within the exclusive
domain of the state governments’, and that it was unacceptable that
‘the government of India had signed the AOA…. without first arriving
at a consensus among the state governments’.(5)
It is clear that a number of state governments have significant
sensitivities regarding agriculture; these appear to have been taken
into account during the consultative process. At the same time, it is
also true that awareness of WTO-related issues is very superficial in
the states, including amongst the state bureaucracy, and the positions
taken by them are largely political rather than being based on the
likely implications of the proposals. T. S. R. Subramanian said that ‘in
most states, the WTO and its rules are regarded as a distant entity
without any immediate consequences for the state government, and
perceived as a largely esoteric subject’.(6)
Industry
back to top
There are two main industry
associations in India. The first, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)
was established as a non-government, industry-led and industry-managed
organization. It has been playing an increasingly active role in putting
forth the views and concerns of industry to the government. Its
membership extends to over 4, 800 companies from the private as well as
public sectors. According to N. Srinivasan, Director-General of the CII,
it ‘provides a platform for sectoral consensus-building and networking’.(7)
He categorized the CII as fulfilling two functions, namely ‘creating
an awareness amongst its members on key WTO issues and providing inputs
to government, based on the feedback received from industry’. The
second industry association, the Federation of Indian Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), was established in 1927, and according to
Manab Majumdar, the association’s Project Leader (WTO), FICCI has been
at the forefront of ‘analyzing the impact of events through a
multi-disciplinary approach involving representatives of business,
academia, policy-makers and foreign experts, and evolving
problem-solving responses’.(8)
These organizations do not
seem to have been consulted during the Uruguay Round. Srinivasan put it
very aptly when he said that ‘for a long time the relationship between
the government and industry was based on a “we-they” syndrome; the
UR reflected the tenuousness of the relationship, with the government
taking most decisions on its own’. Today, the situation has changed
dramatically and these associations are not only consulted regularly,
but also provide critical inputs to government on trade issues.
Srinivasan felt that ‘the turning point of this relationship was the
Seattle Ministerial Conference when, for the first time, representatives
from industry were formally a part of the Indian delegation’.
Academic institutions and think tanks
back to top
During the UR, academic
institutions and think tanks did not feature in the consultative process
at all. Since the UR they have become much more involved, even though
this participation is still somewhat marginal because most of them do
not have the resources needed to conduct a meaningful analysis. At
times, they also lack the sectoral expertise that the modern
multilateral process requires, something which is not uncommon amongst
academic institutions around the world. However, a number of
institutions and think tanks were consulted during the drafting of the
agriculture proposal. These included the National Council for Applied
Economic Research (NCAER), the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT),
the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER)
and the Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and other
Developing Countries (RIS). Dr Anil Sharma, a senior economist in NCAER,
said that ‘our inputs were sought so that MOCI could take informed
positions on various issues and use the analytical data that we provided
to convince domestic lobbies about the appropriateness of these
positions’.(9)
Biswajit Dhar of the IIFT said that ‘even though the terms of
reference of the prescribed work were very broad, the actual inputs
sought by the ministry were invariably needs-based’.(10)
A former official of the MOA stated that these institutions ‘provided
valuable inputs, especially in analyzing the micro-level impact of
liberalization in agriculture, both that had already been undertaken and
that which was being proposed’.
Civil society
back to top
Civil society in India, in the
same way, perhaps, as in any other country, is extremely heterogeneous.
It is not difficult to find groups actively defending or opposing any
point of view in relation to a particular issue. This is not to belittle
their contribution to the overall debate, a fact which seems to be well
accepted. There is an increasing recognition in most government circles
that consultations with civil society are very important. However, there
is still a big question mark as to which non-governmental organization
(NGO) to invite to the consultative process, as there are a very large
number of active NGOs to choose from. As Amrita Narlikar said, ‘the
process of involving NGOs seems to be a self-affirming process with the
more critical ones being often excluded from the inter-ministerial
consultations; the checks and balances, so necessary in such a process
of consultation, seem to be missing’. Officials appeared to have
somewhat preconceived notions of the views of civil society. A former
official of the MOA said that ‘the views expressed by the civil
society representatives are always protectionist in nature. According to
them, Indian agriculture is simply not trade-driven; their only
objective is, therefore, to ensure that the livelihood of the
subsistence farmers is protected.’
III.
Challenges faced and the outcome back to top
Perhaps the most significant
challenge that was faced in arriving at an outcome (that is the final
negotiating proposal) was to put in place a process that would take into
account the very diverse views and positions of the various
stakeholders, while ensuring that a cohesive proposal could be prepared.
The process went through a number of different phases: the initial
identification of the key issues; consultations with the non-governmental
stakeholders, including industry associations; the initial drafting of
the proposal; holding regional and inter-ministerial consultations;
and the final approval by the Cabinet.
Identification of key issues
back to top
As a first step towards
identifying the main issues that would need to be addressed in the
agriculture negotiations, the MOCI and MOA asked the NCAER and IIFT to
analyze the experience of implementing the AOA and to make appropriate
recommendations on the critical issues facing Indian agriculture.
Interestingly, the basic approach to Indian agriculture does not seem to
be the same as far as these institutions are concerned. For example, Dr
Anil Sharma of the NCAER feels that ‘Indian agriculture is quite
competitive and India should adopt a more aggressive stand in the
negotiations’. On the other hand, IIFT had a more conservative
approach and was more closely aligned to the MOA’s position on the
need to protect the agriculture sector. A former official of the TPD
said that ‘though their inputs were very useful, they did not often
factor in the political sensitivities of the issues that they were
analyzing’. Giving one such example, the official said that according
to the econometric analysis carried out by NCAER a somewhat lower bound
rate was proposed as being sufficient to take care of probable import
surges for a particular food security-sensitive commodity, but since
such a low bound rate was not politically acceptable, it was modified
while finalizing the proposal.
The ministries also contacted
a number of well-known agricultural scientists. Some very useful
suggestions appear to have come out of these interactions. For instance,
M. S. Swaminathan, one of the most renowned agricultural economist in
India, came up with the suggestion that India should press for a
livelihood box, in which all the country’s concerns on rural
development and poverty alleviation could be aired.(11)
This concept seems to have been taken on board even though India’s
final proposal talks of a ‘food security box’ rather than a ‘livelihood
box’. At the same time, the policy framers also had to factor in views
such as those expressed by Devinder Sharma, a trade and food policy
analyst who, at that time, wrote that
five years after the World Trade
Organization came into existence, the anticipated gains for India from
the trade liberalization process in agriculture are practically zero.
And yet, undaunted by the negative fallout from the implementation of
the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture is
aggressively pushing for the second phase of reforms. The entire effort
of the free trade initiative is to destroy the foundations of food self-sufficiency
so assiduously built over the years.(12)
Consultations with industry
back to top
Indian industry
representatives appear to have been involved in the entire consultative
process. Srinivasan stated that ‘in addition to providing feedback to
MOCI, CII also lobbied and presented the industry’s view on key issues
to people like Mr Lamy and Mr Zoelick, whom we met on several occasions’.(13)
Manab Majumdar said that ‘FICCI had constituted an agriculture task
force, whose primary mandate was to provide inputs to the government on
agriculture issues’.(14)
He, in fact, felt that it was not the government but the industry
associations which needed to do more, including by apportioning more
resources into their analysis of WTO issues. However, one criticism
levied at industry associations by some of the stakeholders was that
they tended to adopt positions on policy issues that looked suspiciously
similar to those of the government and that they were rarely critical of
government. However, both the representatives of CII and FICCI disagree:
Srinivasan said that ‘we did not hesitate to criticize the government,
although such views are often expressed in private consultations, rather
than in public statements of disagreement’. Majumdar was of the view
that ‘we do have differences with the government but we tend not to
wash our dirty linen in public’.
Inter-ministerial consultations
back to top
Even though the two key
ministries, the MOCI and the MOA, appear to have initiated the process
somewhat independently, they do seem to have kept each other involved
and informed on developments. Subsequently, the interaction between the
two ministries increased even more and culminated in what was
practically a joint negotiating proposal. But the path to the final
common position was not all that smooth. Officials from both ministries
admitted that there were — at times serious — differences on the
position the two ministries wanted to adopt on key issues. R. C. A. Jain,
in trying to explain the reasons for these differences, said that ‘MOCI,
understandably, has a broader perspective and sees agriculture as one of
the sectors being negotiated, whereas for MOA it was difficult to accept
such an approach as agriculture is a very sensitive sector in which
compromises cannot be made’.(15)
He also felt that differences arose because ‘MOCI’s mandate was to
increase India’s share of global trade, while MOA wanted to ensure
that domestic production and the livelihood of small farmers was in no
way threatened.’ A former expert who was closely associated with the
drafting process said that ‘the two ministries were like the two sides
of a convex lens; the inevitability of their relationship being
signified by the two joined ends of the lens, while the differences
amongst them on the approach to key issues is illustrated by the bulging
middle part of the lens’.
State-level consultations
back to top
The central government
organized very wide-ranging consultations on WTO agriculture issues.
In the June—July 2000 issue of MOCI’s monthly newsletter mention is
made that ‘in the process of preparing India’s negotiating position
on agriculture, the government initiated regional consultations at
various places, besides national level consultations, with a view to
generating greater awareness of the issues and to receive views and
suggestions which would facilitate a consensus regarding India’s
position’. However, some people still feel that these consultations
were more of a formality rather than a process that led to significant
changes. T. S. R. Subramanian said that ‘the discussions in these
state-level consultative meetings often remained superficial because
of a lack of in-depth knowledge of WTO issues at the state level’.(16)
An official of the Ministry of Agriculture said that ‘rather than
contributing to the substantive aspects of the negotiating elements,
these discussions tended to largely reflect a fear “psychosis”
of the WTO, and views simply did not emanate in these consultations that
the agriculture negotiations should be seen as an opportunity; instead,
there was an overwhelming feeling that this was a threat which had to be
countered’. A former official of the MOA said that ‘an attempt was
made to explain that the agriculture negotiations did not represent the
kind of threat people made it out to be, but it was very difficult in
view of the unidirectional nature of views that were being expressed.
The best we could do in these circumstances was to build the negotiating
proposal around the objective of maintaining the status quo.’(17)
Finalization of the proposal by the
Cabinet back to top
All these meetings and
consultations played an important role in giving final shape to the
Indian proposal. The Commerce Ministry’s website specifically mentions
that
the Indian proposal jointly
formulated by the Department of Agriculture and Co-operation and
Department of Commerce, reflects the broad consensus which was achieved
through a series of regional-level meetings, meetings with the state
governments, interaction with political parties, representatives of
farmers’ organizations, various autonomous institutions, agricultural
universities and eminent agricultural economists.
As for the involvement of
India’s WTO mission in Geneva, an official said that the mission was
always kept in the picture and provided useful feedback, especially
about the likely reactions of possible/potential alliance partners to
the different elements of the proposal. The final draft was submitted to
the cabinet early in January 2001. While it was not possible to consult
the file on the cabinet note (all such notes are secret), officials
involved with the exercise indicated that since most ministries had been
consulted beforehand practically no changes took place during the
examination by the cabinet. Once approved by the cabinet, the proposal
was transmitted to Geneva.
It was the culmination of this
intense consultative process that led to India’s negotiating proposal
being submitted to the Special Session on Agriculture in January 2001.
As a very detailed proposal, it broadly reflects the concerns and
attempts to address the issues that were raised during the consultative
process. While all three pillars of the negotiations are covered, it
starts with a detailed proposal on food security in which it proposes
the setting up of a food security box which encompasses all the special
and differential treatment flexibilities. In the other sections, there
is an evident thrust on seeking adequate reduction of tariffs, including
tariff peaks, in developed countries, while seeking flexibility not to
reduce tariffs on its food security crops. There is also a clear
reference to the linkage between an a priori reduction in trade
distorting domestic support in developed countries, and reductions in
tariffs in developing countries. It seeks the complete elimination of
all export subsidies. At the same time, it proposes that all measures
taken by developing countries for poverty alleviation, rural
development, rural employment and diversification of agriculture should
be exempted from any reduction commitments.
The perception of the WTO’s role in the
process back to top
The documented records and the
oral interviews that were conducted clearly show that the Indian
proposal on agriculture was finalized mainly through a bureaucratic
process based on consultations with stakeholders. Julius Sen has pointed
out, in relation to the proposals on WTO issues, that ‘India’s
negotiating positions are almost without exception recommended by
Commerce Ministry officials, examined by the Committee of Secretaries,
and then approved by the concerned Cabinet sub-committee’.(18) Clearly
the process was bureaucratically driven and subject to fairly wide-ranging
domestic consultations. And yet, to many, the WTO seems to have a
significant influence, on both the process and outcome. The general
perception is that the WTO is pushing the agenda for global economic
reform and that the agriculture negotiations are a part of this WTO-led
reform agenda. Feelings against the WTO are expressed even more strongly
in the context of reductions in tariffs, especially on agriculture
products, which many of the stakeholders felt would open up domestic
markets with negative implications for rural employment and agriculture
production. The fact that the WTO does not have an organizational
mandate of the kind that the World Bank and the IMF have, and that it is
a completely member-driven organization, where the agenda is set and
executed by the members on the basis of explicit consensus, does not
seem to be a well known, or an accepted fact. Instead, as Amrita
Narlikar said, ‘the general public seems to have a very opinionated
view of the WTO, and even certain civil society organizations and other
institutions who would be expected to have a better understanding of the
WTO, more often than not seem to have a negative perception of the
organization’.(19) Biswajit Dhar, who writes for a number of newspapers,
also said that because of such a perception ‘it is not always very
easy to take a pro-WTO line in public writings’.
A number of reasons were put
forward to explain this perception. The Indian ambassador to the WTO
felt that this was because ‘the general public still regards the WTO
as a developed country club, pushing the agenda at the behest of the
major players and global MNCs’.(20) Another, perhaps more historical,
explanation was given by a former official of the Commerce Ministry, who
said that ‘when India signed up to the Uruguay Round Agreements the
long-term implications of many of the obligations it was undertaking
were far from clear. Later, when quantitative restrictions had to be
lifted and patent protections tightened, there was a public outcry. At
that stage it was convenient to attribute the responsibility for these
decisions to the WTO.’ The former Indian ambassador to the WTO
supported such an explanation, when he said that ‘the public at large
has a very negative perception of the TRIPS Agreement and there is a
feeling that developing countries, including India, were literally
coerced into accepting the agreement; a feeling that is still very
deeply entrenched in the Indian psyche and colours the general
perception of the WTO even today’. These feelings become even more
pronounced in the context of agriculture. A former official of the MOA
said that ‘self-sufficiency in agriculture is still seen as the
single most important achievement after independence, and there is a
feeling that the WTO is out to undo this very achievement by its
insistence on liberalization, without acknowledging the importance of
self-sustainable domestic production’.
Not that balanced views were
not forthcoming. Srinivasan of the CII said that their members
understood that ‘the WTO only provides a platform for negotiations and
it was up to member countries to negotiate outcomes of interest to them’.
Others too acknowledged that many positive things had come about because
of the WTO. For instance, Biswajit Dhar said that ‘the consumer in
India today has a much wider choice, mainly because of the removal of
quantitative restrictions’. Subramanian said that ‘there has been a
vast improvement in the efficiency and in the customer service of the
banking sector after foreign banks were allowed to open up branches in
the country’. But these positive outcomes are rarely acknowledged.
Subramanian, in fact, equated the WTO to the British Raj in India,
which, according to him, ‘got blamed for things, but never got credit
for the positive changes it introduced’.
IV. Lessons for others
(the players’ views) back to top
It is not very easy to
generalize, or to draw lessons from a process which had so many
protagonists, especially as their contributions were spread out both
geographically and temporally. Some of the decision-making processes
have definitely been institutionalized and it would not be wrong to
assume that they would be followed whenever decisions are being taken on
other WTO-related issues. It is also clear that the consultative
process in India had come a long way, especially as compared with the
situation before the Uruguay Round, and the debate on the various tenets
of trade policy had been thrown open to a much wider audience. As the
present analysis shows, very wide-ranging consultations, spread out
over more than two years, were held while finalizing negotiating the
proposal on agriculture. As obtained from the records of the Commerce
Ministry, in addition to a very large number of informal consultations,
a total of fourteen formal consultative meetings were held with
stakeholders between 1999 and 2001.
The inclusiveness of the
consultative process is also borne out by the reactions of some of the
key stakeholders. The associations representing Indian industry appear
to be largely satisfied with the consultative process. The Director-General
of CII said that ‘we were involved at all stages of the process’,
and that the ‘final proposal adequately reflects the concerns that we
brought to the government’s attention’. Similarly, Manab Majumdar of
FICCI said that ‘the process of consultations followed during the
course of finalizing the agriculture proposal reflects the exponential
increase in interaction between government and the industry associations’.
However, the position is less clear as far as the involvement of the
actual agricultural producers is concerned. Where rural agricultural
worker unions exist, their political priorities seem to limit their
capacity to organize themselves at the grass-roots level; they also
appear reluctant to go beyond their own immediate spheres of interest.
Clearly, therefore, the ability of agricultural workers’ groups to
influence the government still remains very limited. To some extent
their views were reflected in the stance taken by the MOA, whose
officials were generally satisfied with the final proposal. Jain felt
that this was because ‘of a clear understanding at the political level
that on issues of substance the views of MOA would prevail’.(21) There is
also no denying that the process was kept very transparent. Flyers were
put out on the official website at every stage, and comments appear to
have been regularly solicited from the various stakeholders. However, it
also appears that the political bosses preferred to play safe and were
more comfortable with a defensive strategy rather than pushing
aggressively for market reforms. As a former Cabinet Secretary said, ‘the
politicians do not want to lose their domestic support for events taking
place in far away Geneva and therefore tend to adopt an intransigent
stand, especially on an issue like agriculture, where that domestic
constituency is as large as 700 million people’.(22)
It would, therefore, not be
wrong to conclude that the Indian position and policy approach to the
agriculture negotiations in the WTO were arrived at on the basis of some
very intensive cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial consultations,
and then adopted at the highest possible level in the government. Apart
from the officials in the ministries of Commerce and Agriculture,
representatives of various autonomous institutions, agricultural
universities and eminent agricultural economists were also involved in
the process. In addition, inputs were sought from the state governments,
representatives of different political parties and civil society.
Clearly, therefore, this was a decision taken by the government on the
basis of expressed domestic concerns.
Such a decision-making process would seem to
fit in with the mandate and role of the WTO as a facilitator of an inter-governmental
dialogue that leads, among other things, to binding decisions on the
governments involved. The WTO, as is well known, though perhaps not well
enough propagated, is not an independent or self-contained entity with
the constitutional legitimacy to take decisions in the name of its
members. Rather, it is a vehicle for decision-making among national
governments vested with sovereign authority. The present analysis
strengthens this view, since clearly in the formulation of India’s
agriculture negotiating proposal there is very little, if anything at
all, that can be attributed to extraneous factors, including the WTO.
And yet the spectre of the WTO, not as an institution mandated merely to
facilitate the negotiating process, but as an institution attempting to
influence domestic decision-making process, does not seem to have
completely disappeared. The WTO is still perceived somewhat negatively.
The general view seems to be that it is an institution seeking to
undermine domestic policy space. There is clearly a lack of
understanding about the WTO’s mandate and the member-driven nature
of the organization. The dichotomy between a decision-making process
which was no doubt completely domestic and clearly very democratic, and
the perception of the WTO as an organization attempting to influence
domestic decision-making processes, is perhaps best summed up by
excerpts from two different interviews that the Union Agriculture
Minister gave recently. While speaking to the Financial Express,
he said ‘let me make it amply clear that India will not succumb to any
pressure…. we will take a pragmatic view on various issues…. we will
not compromise on safeguarding the interests of the small and marginal
farmers’(23) — a statement that clearly emphasizes the domestic
imperatives of India’s position in the agriculture negotiations.
However, in another interview(24) given very soon afterwards, he still
referred to the ‘threat from the WTO’, a threat whose only basis is
perhaps a continuing, though hopefully diminishing, legacy from the
Uruguay Round, when the responsibility of certain politically
uncomfortable decisions had been apportioned to the WTO.
NOTES:
1.-
G/AG/NG/W/102, 15 Jan. 2001 back to text
2.- Government of India’s allocation of
business orders of June 2004. back to text
3.- Unlike most foreign missions, that
invariably lobby for their government’s position, there is very little
evidence of Indian embassies abroad performing similar lobbying in the
context of the agriculture negotiations. This could perhaps be explained
by the minimal involvement of the MEA in the drafting of the agriculture
proposal. back to text
4.- The government of India has designated
certain subjects, including agriculture, as state subjects, which are
areas where the basic and residual authority to legislate has been
delegated to the state governments. Areas such as external affairs,
defence and finance have been placed in the corresponding list of areas
falling within the competence of the central government. Interestingly,
there is also a concurrent list on which both the central and state
governments can legislate. back to text
5.- Views expressed in a meeting of Chief
Ministers convened in May 2001. back to text
6.- Interview with T. S. R. Subramanian, former
Cabinet Secretary, who normally, though not necessarily, is the most
senior civil servant in the country. back to text
7.- Interview with N. Srinivasan,
Director-General, CII. back to text
8.- Interview with Manab Majumdar, Project
Leader WTO Issues, FICCI. back to text
9.- Interview with Dr Anil Sharma, Senior
Economist, NCAER. back to text
10.- Interview with Biswajit Dhar, head of the
WTO Unit, IIFT. back to text
11.- As quoted in the 3-16 Feb. 2001 issue of Frontline
Magazine, in which Dr Swaminathan is reported to have made this
suggestion in a convocation address given by him at the Kerala
Agriculture University on 29 Dec. 2000. back to text
12.- Devinder Sharma, ‘WTO and Indian
Agriculture: The End Result Is Zero’. back to text
13.- Interview with Srinivasan. back to text
14.- Interview with Majumdar. back to text
15.- Interview with R. C. A. Jain, former
Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture. back to text
16.- Interview with Subramanian, who earlier had
also worked as Joint Secretary in the Trade Policy Division (TPD) of the
MOCI. back to text
17.- Interview with R. Agarwal, former Director
of the MOA. back to text
18.- Interview with Julius Sen, a former Indian
administrative service officer, now an Associate Director and Senior
Programme Adviser at Enterprise LSE, London School of Economics. back to text
19.- Interview with Amrita Narlikar, Lecturer in
International Relations at the Centre of International Studies,
University of Cambridge. back to text
20.- Interview with K. M. Chandrasekhar, Indian
ambassador to the WTO. back to text
21.- Interview with Jain. back to text
22.- Interview with Subramanian. back to text
23.- Interview with Sharad Pawar, Minister of
Agriculture, Financial Express, 7 June 2004. back to text
24.- Interview with Pawar, India Today, 5
July 2004. back to text
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* Counsellor, Development Division, World Trade Organization. The
views expressed in this case study do not reflect those of the WTO or its
members and are purely an expression of the author’s assessment of
decision-making processes in India in the context of the agriculture
negotiations. The study is based on a number of interviews that he carried
out in July-Aug. 2004. The author wishes to thank all those people who
agreed to be interviewed, without whose valuable inputs and insight this
case study would not have been possible.
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